COMMENTS
"AFTER CHICAGO": AN EXAGGERATED
DEMISE?
JOHN SHEPARD WILEY JR.*

Professor Herbert Hovenkamp recently published Antitrust Policy
After Chicago,I an important critique of the ascendant Chicago School of
antitrust analysis. For more than seventy pages Professor Hovenkamp
battered away at the weaknesses in the Chicago story. Yet when the dust
had settled, we were left with only a handful of cases that Professor
Hovenkamp would decide differently from the Chicagoans. Although I
am a fellow skeptic, I fear that Professor Hovenkamp's analysis of these
cases is vulnerable to powerful criticism-criticism that may eliminate
wholly the decisional differences between Professor Hovenkamp and the
Chicago School. If no meaningful damage results from such a major
critical onslaught, Professor Hovenkamp's effort may testify ironically to
the strength, not the weakness, of his target.
Antitrust Policy After Chicago should not be dismissed so easily. In
support of Professor Hovenkamp's critique, I offer an interpretation that
emphasizes his disagreement with the Chicagoans over the goals of antitrust policy rather than his disagreement with their analysis of strategic
conduct. Thus interpreted, Professor Hovenkamp's work joins a growing body of scholarship critical of an efficiency goal-but not necessarily
of efficiency reasoning.
I.

IS CHICAGO IGNORANT OF STRATEGY?

Professor Hovenkamp faults the Chicagoans for failing "to take
strategic behavior seriously."' 2 He defines strategic behavior generally as
conduct designed to reduce the attractiveness of offers against which the
firm must compete. 3 This expansive definition faces a great problem: a
firm can most easily reduce the attractiveness of its competitors' offers by
Copyright 0 John Shepard Wiley Jr.
* Acting Professor of Law, U.C.L.A. Law School. I thank Frank Easterbrook, Herbert
Hovenkamp, and Ben Klein for helpful comments.
1. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985).
2. Id. at 261.
3. Id. at 260.
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making a better offer itself. The definition therefore condemns the very
competitive process that antitrust policy is supposed to promote.
Realizing the debilitatingly expansive sweep of this definition of
"strategy," Professor Hovenkamp immediately qualifies it; strategy is
harmful only when it reduces the attractiveness of competing offers
"without producing substantial gains in productive efficiency to the
strategizing firm."' 4 The Chicago School, however, is unlikely to dispute
the general notion that antitrust policy ought to attack predatory conduct that has no efficiency justification. 5 Professor Hovenkamp thus
must mean that the Chicagoans do not fairly account for inefficient strategic behavior in particular cases. To support this thesis, Professor
Hovenkamp cites the recent Supreme Court decision in Aspen Skiing Co.
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.6 1 think that Aspen Skiing illustrates
something-but not exactly what Professor Hovenkamp claims.
A. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
Professor Hovenkamp analyzes the conduct at issue in Aspen Skiing
as "an example of strategic behavior that both raised a rival's costs disproportionately to those of the defendant [Ski Company] and reduced the
relative attractiveness of the rival's market offering while simultaneously
producing no efficiency gains to the defendant." '7 Professor Hovenkamp
thus offers the decision to illustrate the Chicago School's myopia. I believe that Aspen Skiing instead provides a good demonstration of both
the flexibility of standard Chicagoan analysis and the Supreme Court's
lack of enthusiasm for it.
In Aspen Skiing the Court held that Ski Company violated the Sherman Act by withdrawing from a joint ticketing venture with Aspen
Highlands, the only other ski-slope operator in Aspen.8 The joint venture had sold a six-day pass that enabled purchasers to ski at Ski Company's three Aspen mountains as well as at Highlands' mountain, and
had split these ticketing revenues between Ski Company and Aspen
Highlands. These six-day, four-mountain tickets thus permitted skiers to
avoid ticket lines in Aspen and yet retain the daily option to ski at the
4. Id. at 261.
5. Judge Bork's treatment of Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), illustrates this point. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 34445 (1978). Judge Bork also agrees about the anticompetitive character of other forms of strategic
behavior that Professor Hovenkamp identifies. Compare id. at 347 ("Predation by abuse of governmental procedures.., presents an increasingly dangerous threat to competition.") with Hovenkamp,
supra note 1, at 276-77 (discussing litigation and lobbying).
6. 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
7. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 282 (footnote omitted).
8. Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2856-62.
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Aspen mountain of their choice. 9
I expected the Chicago School to respond with something like the

following reasoning to the Court's condemnation of Skiing Company's
conduct. 10 Ski Company may have sought to make the transition from
competitor in a local ski-resort market to competitor in the national market. To do that, one must advertise nationally. But a ticketing arrangement that divides any resulting increase in revenue with a local
competitor saps the incentive to go forward with the marketing strategy.
If Ski Company invests in advertising to bring more skiers from across

the nation to Aspen, Highlands will reap a part of the return on that
investment. This Chicago story emphasizes that Highlands' free riding

on Ski Company's advertising costs hampers Ski Company's ability to
compete in the national market. The story thus identifies a possible justi-

fication for Ski Company's decision to terminate its joint venture.
The Chicago School has used logic like this to construct efficiency
justifications for the conduct at issue in United States v. Topco Associ-

ates,1 ' ContinentalT V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 12 and a host of other
decisions. 13 I expect that Chicagoans would observe that the facts re-

ported in Aspen Skiing lend some support to this free-rider hypothesis:
that Ski Company advertised nationally only after it had withdrawn from

the joint ticketing venture. 14 I likewise expect that the possibility of "less
restrictive alternatives" to Ski Company's termination of the joint ticketing venture would do little to cause the Chicagoans to reject the hypothesis. There are less restrictive alternatives to most business practices-but
9. Id. at 2850-51.
10. I have not been disappointed. While this comment was in editing, Judge Frank Easterbrook published a typically pungent deconstruction. See Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary
Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 975-76 (1986), see also Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust
Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1710-11 (1986). Cf Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986) (separate statement of Judges Flaum and Bauer) (scolding litigant with temerity to suggest that Judge Richard Posner "has seized an opportunity to preempt [Aspen Skiing] and emasculate its principles while purporting to give the case careful and
respectful consideration").
From a different perspective, Professors Krattenmaker and Salop also have commented upon
Aspen Skiing. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 212-13, 291 (1986).
11. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
12. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
13. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 5, at 430-34.
14. The Court noted that
[als far as Ski Co. was concerned, the all-Aspen ticket [joint venture with Highlands] was
dead. In its place Ski Co. offered the 3-area, 6-day ticket featuring only its mountains. In
an effort to promote this ticket, Ski Co. embarked on a national advertising campaign that
strongly implied to people [that Ski Co.'s mountains] were the only ski mountains in the
[Aspen] area.
Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2852.
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always at a cost. In this case, the most obvious less restrictive alternative
would have been for Ski Company to ask Highlands to contribute a fair
share of the advertising costs. Presumably this alternative would have
increased Ski Company's costs by forcing it to do a number of bothersome things: negotiate with Highlands on the nature and extent of the ad
campaign; determine Highlands' "fair" contribution, perhaps through
continued or added market research; accept the loss of flexibility that
committee decisionmaking brings; and police the general product quality
of the firm to whose reputation it is now wedded by national advertising.
These costs to Ski Company of combating Highlands' free riding might
be as great as the costs of simply accepting it. Moreover, the added costs
could have the same effect as the free riding: that of deterring Ski Company's national advertising and national competitive presence.
By asserting a free-rider problem, the predicted Chicago School
analysis implies two objections to Professor Hovenkamp's treatment of
Aspen Skiing. First, Professor Hovenkamp asserts that ending the joint
venture caused overall demand for Aspen skiing to fall.15 The Chicago
School free-rider analysis, however, predicts a relative increase in overall
demand for Aspen skiing after the joint venture was terminated. If Ski
Company's national marketing strategy worked as planned, the free-rider
analysis would anticipate that Ski Company's promotional efforts would
16
win it a larger share of the national market.
I make no constructive effort to test these Chicago hypotheses with
an econometric analysis of post-1978 skiing demand. But I am happy to
take the lazy route of throwing rocks at Professor Hovenkamp's work.
He concludes that demand for Aspen skiing in fact did fall because the
Aspen Skiing opinion recited evidence-mainly surveys and anecdotesshowing that some consumers preferred a four-slope ticket to a threeslope ticket.17 This conclusion is a non sequitur. Nearly everybody will
say, if asked, that they would like more of nearly everything. But that
does not show that even one person valued a four-way option enough to
quit skiing in Aspen because the choice had shrunk to a three-way option. In any event, a four-way choice remained available to anyone passionate enough to stand in separate ticket lines; this factor makes it
particularly unlikely that a significant drop in demand greeted Ski Company's withdrawal from the joint venture. Finally and most importantly,
Professor Hovenkamp's explanation of reduced demand neglects entirely
the influx of new skiers that presumably would result from Ski Company's national advertising-the very benefit to Ski Company (and con15. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 281.
16. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 979.
17. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 281 & n.312 (citing Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2859-60).
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sumers) that a Chicagoan would say suffices to offset any heartfelt
consumer dissatisfaction.
This last thought brings me to the second objection a Chicagoan
would make to Professor Hovenkamp's analysis: market definition. A
free-rider analysis would explain Ski Company's conduct as an attempt
to improve its position in the national skiing market. That analysis thus
would presume the relevant geographic market to be the nation, not the
Aspen area. 18 On this score, the Chicago School can count Professor
Hovenkamp as an ally against himself, for he states that "[t]here is good
reason to believe... that the [Aspen Skiing geographic] market was defined too narrowly." 19
The predicted Chicago School analysis is not bulletproof (or even
rockproof) by any stretch of the imagination. It suffers the disadvantage
common to many Chicago School explanations: even when litigation
pressure was strongest, Ski Company never offered a free-rider justification for its withdrawal from the joint ticketing venture. Chicagoans have
replied to this concern. 20 Until they are proven, however, the Chicago
School's hypotheses (or "fitness fairy tales," as some evolutionary biologists derisively label similar theorizing) remain only inventive possibilities. Doubters will demand empirical verification that the free-rider
explanation truly accounted for the defendant's conduct, and it is just
this sort of dogged empirical verification that I (and the Chicago School)
have declined to pursue.
Like most good legal fights, this one boils down to the question of
who bears the burden of proof. Should business actions be presumptively
illegal, escaping condemnation only if defendants can disprove fears of
harm by convincingly justifying their behavior? Or should commercial
conduct be presumptively legal, falling to legal attack only when plaintiffs can negative favorable interpretations of defendants' acts by proving
how they are harmful? I have not spoken to this question.
My first conclusion about Aspen Skiing thus must be very limited;
neither the Supreme Court nor I confidently can declare the "real" effect
18. The jury found the relevant geographic market to be the Aspen area, a conclusion that Ski
Company failed to dispute in the Supreme Court. Aspen Skiing, 105 S.Ct. at 2854 & n.20.
19. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 281 n.31 1. See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 518.1h (Supp. 1986) (criticizing Aspen Skiing's market definition); Campbell, The
Antitrust Record of the FirstReagan Administration, 64 TEx. L. REV. 353, 360 (1985) (Aspen Skiing's market definition is "open to question"); Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 979 ("Aspen is not a
market .... ).
20. See Alchian, Uncertainty,Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. EcON. 211, 220-21
(1950) (arguing that economists "can predict the more adaptable or variable types of economic interrelationships ... even if individuals themselves are unable to ascertain them"); Easterbrook, supra
note 10, at 975 ("To award victory to the plaintiff because the defendant has failed to justify the
conduct properly is to turn ignorance ...into prohibition.").
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of Ski Company's conduct. I have explained why I doubt that Professor
Hovenkamp's article explains that conduct any better. The resulting uncertainty about the "true" nature of Ski Company's practices may be
enough for some to conclude that they properly were damned. But Chicagoans are on record as supporting corporate freedom "when no affirmative case for intervention is shown." 21 This fundamental predisposition
is the most basic reason they will reject Professor Hovenkamp's assertion
that Aspen Skiing illustrates strategic behavior that they wrongfully
ignore.
My second conclusion is that, Aspen Skiing's rhetoric notwithstanding,2 2 Aspen Skiing's result proves that the Supreme Court has yet to
undergo an impressive conversion to Chicago thinking.2 3 This conversion has been so often hailed in the past that even critics like Professor
Hovenkamp are beginning to agree. But a Supreme Court that is not
significantly Chicagoan in its approach to antitrust must make one pause
before analyzing the direction of antitrust "after Chicago."
B.

Alcoa' Price Squeeze.

Professor Hovenkamp claims to uncover a second example of the
Chicago School's ignorance of strategy by disputing its critique of the
price squeeze in United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica.24 Alcoa, the
aluminum monopolist, squeezed independent aluminum fabricators by
charging them high prices, integrating vertically into fabrication, and
selling fabricated aluminum at prices too low to permit the independents
to earn a "living profit."' 25 Chicagoans generally conclude that this conduct raises no efficiency, and hence no antitrust, problem.2 6 Professor
Hovenkamp faults Chicagoans for analyzing the problem under the unrealistic assumption that the independent fabricators faced no sunk or
fixed costs. 2 7 Under more realistic assumptions, he argues, a squeezing
monopolist can extract an independent but vertically related firm's "re'28
turn on the fixed-cost part of its investment.
21. R. BORK, supra note 5, at 133; Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 975 & n.10. Cf Hovenkamp,
Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1721 (1986) (replying to Judge
Easterbrook).
22. See Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2860-61 (discussing lack of an "efficiency justification").
23. This is abundantly clear from other recent decisions. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
24. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
25. Id. at 436-442.
26. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS 874-75 (2d ed. 1981); Bork, Vertical Integrationand the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 163-65 (1954).
27. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 269 & n.271.
28. Id. at 269.
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Chicagoans will ask, so what? Their standard argument will be that
such distributive concerns do not have efficiency consequences. I understand Professor Hovenkamp to reply that the wealth appropriation
causes inefficiency, not in the current case, but rather in the futurewhen the prospect of unremedied appropriation will chill efficient
29
investment.
This argument is clever but not convincing. The idea is that antitrust judges should look out for firms too short-sighted to avoid industrial vulnerability so that future consumers can secure the benefits of
these firms' long-run investments. In short, to ensure that fools continue
to take risks, the proposal is to make the wisdom of hindsight the basis
for an antitrust claim. Even if this notion is exhilarating enough to
sweep aside its disquieting implications, Chicagoans will fault Professor
Hovenkamp for failing to provide any reason to believe that the chill on
efficient investment is in fact significant. At least one firm will always
have an investment incentive unaffected by the risk of a lurking opportunistic monopolist: the monopolist itself. And if vertical integration is
less efficient than independent production, the Chicagoans reply, the monopolist may gain by trading with independent, vertically related firms.
Accordingly, the monopolist will have an incentive to split a benefit with
an independent by offering the independent long-term contractual protection against the monopolist's opportunism. 30 Finally, to Professor
Hovenkamp's point that "not every situation conducive to taking advantage of sunk cost commitments can be foreseen," 31 the Chicagoans would
reply that no investment chill occurs when firms foresee no threat of opportunism. The Chicagoans thus will lampoon Professor Hovenkamp's
complaints about the Alcoa squeeze as resting either upon an efficiency
problem that firms can eliminate if it is efficient for them to do so, or
32
upon no credible problem at all.
C. Bonjorno's Supply Squeeze.
Professor Hovenkamp continues his critique of conventional Chicago School wisdom by arguing that the Chicagoans' failure to condemn
firms for attempting price squeezes ignores a second inefficiency: facilitated horizontal collusion. 33 He uses Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum &
29. Id. at 267-68.
30. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 499-502 (1974); Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration,Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302-07 (1978).
31. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 267.
32. A similar criticism would extend to Professor Hovenkamp's analysis, id. at 267-70, of Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
33. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 268-74.
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Chemical Corp.34 to illustrate his point. In Bonjorno the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit condemned Kaiser Company for
squeezing Columbia Co., an independent fabricator of aluminum drainage pipe. According to Professor Hovenkamp, oligopolistic aluminum
manufacturers (including Kaiser) tacitly divided product markets in pursuit of monopoly pricing. To prevent buyers from disrupting their cartel,
the manufacturers tried to force exclusive-dealing contracts upon their
independent downstream customers. In particular, Kaiser applied a
classical price squeeze to pressure Columbia into an exclusive-dealing arrangement. When Columbia still refused, Kaiser squeezed harder-and
Columbia died. 35 Thus interpreted, Bonjorno demonstrates a sensible judicial reaction to an anticompetitive strategy that Chicago analysis has
overlooked.
Chicagoans are apt to fault Professor Hovenkamp's strategic explanation of the Bonjorno price squeeze as puzzlingly circular. In essence,
Professor Hovenkamp maintains that Kaiser sought exclusive-dealing
contracts to facilitate horizontal collusion, but used horizontal collusion
to compel exclusive dealing. Professor Hovenkamp thereby uses the inefficient consequence of the price squeeze as apremise to explain how Kaiser could threaten Columbia with exclusive dealing or death. Suppose
Kaiser's motive truly were to collude with other manufacturers. Rather
than plead with or threaten customers until they accepted exclusive dealing, it would seem far simpler for the manufacturers to refuse concertedly to sell to each others' customers. Professor Hovenkamp does
not explain why a manufacturers' cartel would bother entreating unwilling customers to help accomplish an objective that the manufacturers
could achieve entirely on their own. If some such reason did exist, moreover, it is unclear why Kaiser would threaten Columbia with the relatively mild tactic of a price squeeze when Kaiser's complete refusal to
deal with Columbia makes the same coercive threat with greater force
36
and possibly less legal risk.
A standard doubting Thomas from the Chicago School would argue
that "[i]t is important to see that [Kaiser] must offer something to [Columbia] to get [Columbia] to sign requirements contracts . . . which
means.., creation of efficiency." ' 37 Professor Hovenkamp's explanation
of the "something" that Kaiser offers is an inefficient threat: "Sign up or
else I will squeeze you out of business." If Kaiser can truly count on the
34. 752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3284 (1986).
35. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 271-72.

36. Cf United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (Sherman Act does not restrict
manufacturer's right to exercise discretion as to parties with whom it will deal).
37. R. BORK, supra note 5, at 304-05.
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cooperation of its rivals, however, the purpose that Professor
Hovenkamp would assign to its conduct-cooperation between Kaiser
and its competitors-has already been achieved. Conversely, if Kaiser
cannot count on its rivals' cooperation, then its strategy of gaining that
cooperation through a price squeeze will probably fail. Kaiser can
squeeze Columbia out of business only if Kaiser can be assured that its
rival manufacturers will honor their tacit agreement to divide the market
for their products. Otherwise Kaiser's rivals will profit from Kaiser's
blustering by stepping into its shoes as Columbia's supplier. Because this
"inefficient threat" argument makes little sense, the Chicagoans would
argue that another, presumably efficient explanation is likely to account
for Kaiser's action. This Chicago School story concludes that
Bonjorno-like Alcoa-made more uncomprehending law by condemning presumably efficient (or at least not demonstrably inefficient) conduct.
Once again, I am not arguing that the Chicagoans really are right; I
have not done the work necessary to establish the real reasons for Kaiser's behavior. Rather, I make the weaker point that critics of the Chicago School must come up with more convincing or elaborated
explanations of why cases like Bonjorno were properly decided. If critics
fail to explain why predictable variations of basic Chicago School themes
do not apply in certain cases, one's first reaction is to assume that these
themes have not been considered adequately or that they do apply-a
reaction that tends to establish quite the opposite of the critic's objective.
I. CHICAGO SCHOOL GOALS, NOT CHICAGO
SCHOOL STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Professor Hovenkamp's critique is strongest where it is the most basic: his attack on the Chicagoan position concerning the proper goals of
antitrust policy. He pummels the Chicagoans, as other heavy hitters
have before him, for their audacious and implausible claim that eco38
nomic efficiency is the only goal of consequence to antitrust policy.
Professor Hovenkamp repeats his argument that antitrust policy cannot
38. Hovenkamp, supra note I,at 244-55. See also Kaplow, The Accuracy of TraditionalMarket Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817 (1982); Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Scherer, The PosnerianHarvest: Separating Wheat from
Chaff (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J. 974, 977-79 (1977). My favorite remark about the Chicago
School efficiency argument comes from economist Kenneth Elzinga, who describes it as "ingenious
and appealing, not only because of the pristine conclusion it reaches. But like King Agrippa after
hearing the Apostle Paul, one remains only 'almost persuaded.'" Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust:
Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1192 n.2
(1977).
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legitimately or logically ignore distributive concerns.3 9 Other critics of
the Chicago School have argued that a reading of the legislative history
of the antitrust laws points to a goal that is distributive in character: the
goal of preserving the wealth that ultimate or household consumers
would realize by engaging in transactions in rivalrous markets. On this
reading, antitrust policy aims to block producer efforts to appropriate an
entitlement properly belonging to consumers. 4° The language of economic theory can restate this analysis precisely: the goal of antitrust policy is to maintain or increase the size of consumers' surplus, not, as the
Chicagoan would argue, to maximize the sum of consumers' and produ41
cers' surplus.
This conflict between an efficiency and a consumer-surplus goal
sounds more contentious than it really is in most cases. If Professor
Hovenkamp agrees with my predicted Chicago criticisms of his analyses
of Aspen Skiing, Alcoa, and Bonjorno, then those cases would be resolved
the same way under either the goal of economic efficiency or the goal of
distributive justice for consumers. Under either view, all three cases
would be decided in favor of the defendant.
This operational congruence between different goals might seem surprising. But it should not be, if we accept that consumers generally benefit from efficient producer conduct in competitive markets. A typical
decision aiming to serve distributive justice for consumers will thus find
Chicago School analysis to be of continued relevance. The efficiency goal
and the goal of ensuring consumers their distributive share do diverge in
some areas. 42 But these areas are the exception rather than the rule, and
43
may be of more theoretical than practical concern.
The consumer wealth goal should not be equated with a populist
goal embodying simple hostility to big business, for conflict can also exist
between these two goals. For instance, notable merger precedents of the
Warren Court era 44 are difficult to defend in terms of a consumer surplus
goal. On the basis of increased industrial concentration, the Court invali39. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 244-49. See also Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the
Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 38, at 93-96.
41. See, e.g., Leibeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiorityin ConcentratedIndustries,25
UCLA L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1978) ("Antitrust should permit maximization of the sum of the consumer and producer surplus.").
42. See, e.g., Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerationsin MergerEnforcement, 71 CALIr. L.
REv. 1580, 1592, 1626-36 (1983).
43. Cf id. at 1677 ("A system that considered all relevant facts in the hope of achieving a better
merger decision would almost certainly produce judicial chaos.").
44. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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dated mergers that promised efficiency benefits for consumers 45 even
though the proposed mergers were extremely unlikely to induce the evil
associated with industrial concentration-that is, horizontal collusion
among firms that is harmful to consumers. 46 This conflict between populist and consumer-surplus goals is not inevitable. It is quite possible to
interpret the populist distaste for big business as decisive only when business becomes so concentrated that it threatens the material welfare of
consumers. This limited version of populism would not fit comfortably
with the frankly antiefficient populism of the Warren Court.47 My point
here, however, is simply that antitrust decisions that are consistent with a
consumer surplus goal can be harmonized with both the classical Chicago School's efficiency beacon and at least one version of the populist
goal frequently acknowledged by antitrust decisionmakers.
One might dismiss this general congruence among goals of efficiency, consumer surplus, and a limited form of populism as a testament
to the insignificance of the debate over proper goals. If the cases mostly
come out the same, what's the difference? The difference is that critics
like Professor Hovenkamp give us compelling arguments against the legitimacy of using the antitrust laws solely to promote economic efficiency. That problem of legitimacy vanishes, however, if we recognize
that virtually the entire Chicago School toolbox of analytical gadgets is
relevant to his discussion of a distributive goal, particularly that of defending consumers' wealth entitlement. For all his professed criticism,
Professor Hovenkamp may thus appear to the Chicagoans like a blessing
in disguise.

45. See, e.g., Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 278 (regarding "competition" as preservation of small
businesses, without regard to consumer welfare); Pabst Brewing, 384 U.S. at 552-53 (same); Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344 (observing that "some results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers," but citing likelihood of increased efficiency as ground for invalidating merger).
46. Cf R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 180-81 (1984) (repeated competitive
interaction between a pair of players can lead to collusive behavior). But see R. Boyd & P. Richerson, The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizeable Groups 23 (February 6, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (reciprocity is likely to evolve only when number of players is quite small).
47. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (offering one merger
partner's "substantial advantages" in marketing as reason to condemn merger).

